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CONFLICT BETWEEN ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING THROUGH
INTER-GROUP CONTACTS IN THE
CONTEXT
OF CONFLICT BETWEEN ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN: CHALLENGES
AND OPPORTUNITIES
Rovshan Sadigbayli, MA in International Relations
Introduction
The
complex nature of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan where elements of
ethnicity, identity and historical narratives are closely interconnected with
territorial claims requires multi-faceted approach in its settlement. As
evidenced by the dynamics of the conflict during the last century, although the
Soviet rule ended the hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan for a while,
the conflict between the two countries has transformed into what is called
"negative peace", i.e. absence of direct physical violence1 whereas the tensions
were left simmering throughout the Soviet period only to erupt with renewed
intensity in 1988.
There is an understanding that if the lasting peace is to be achieved additional
efforts should be made to reconcile the opposing nations and communities by
fostering mutual understanding, tolerance and peaceful coexistence with the
ultimate goal of eradicating sense of animosity and hatred2. Although the
emphasis is usually put on inter-state peace negotiations as a political means
to find solution to this protracted conflict, there are increasingly calls to
implement confidence-building measures between the two countries and use tools
of track II or citizen diplomacy, i.e. conflict mediation efforts by unofficial
people, humanitarian organizations and NGOs outside official political
negotiation process.
However, there are divergent opinions on whether initiatives that pursue the
above-mentioned goals can be introduced as a conflict resolution tool when
formal peace talks have not yet yielded positive results or such measures are
applicable and can produce positive results only in post-conflict settings when
there is already a political agreement in place3.
Confidence-building is a very broad field and includes all kinds of programs
differing in goals, target groups and means of achievements. For the scope of
this article I will narrow the broad concept and will focus primarily on
inter-group contacts. I will identify lessons learned from the actual programs
carried out in various parts of the world, which can be generalized and serve as
a theoretical basis for analyzing strengths and weaknesses of contacts between
the representatives of the conflicting societies as a conflict resolution tool.
In particular I will elaborate on the factors and conditions that may
potentially hinder implementation of such confidence-building programs in the
context of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
"Contact hypothesis" as a theoretical
framework for peace-building programs
In
the regions of protracted conflict programs designed to improve relations
between the opposing nations target collectives as a whole (as groups) and not
as separated individuals4. Although depending on the dynamics of a conflict,
confidence-building programs differ from one another in scope and modalities,
they have one common underlying feature: they address the socio-psychological
aspects of conflict and see changing perceptions, stereotypes and prejudices
pertaining to the entire conflicting groups as their ultimate goal5. Pruitt and
Kim argue that "unlike emotions (such as blame, anger and fear) which diminish
and eventually disappear when conflict is over, hostile attitudes and
perceptions are persistent, in a sense that they can last longer than the
conflict itself and may lead to escalation of new conflict and/or generate
perceptions of conflict where none exist"6.
In
achieving these goals, confidence building and reconciliation programs
essentially draw their theoretical basis from the principles of the "contact
hypothesis" theory formulated by Gordon Allport in his classic book "The Nature
of Prejudice". The contact hypothesis assumes that facilitating inter-group
contact may change attitudes and perceptions between opposing groups, eliminate
mutual prejudices and stereotypes and eventually diminish hostilities and
subsequently improve inter-group relations7.
The
basic assumption behind fostering contacts between conflicting groups is that if
left unaddressed, repressed painful experiences may negatively affect people's
behavior and attitudes8. To this end, the ultimate goal of such inter-group
encounters is helping people to deal with their psychological trauma and
emotions associated with conflict through emotional process of healing
psychological wounds through sharing a personal story (the storytelling process)
and apology for past wrongdoings.
By
encouraging people to feel empathy toward others and take roles of the
representatives of the other group, such programs aim at training people to see
the conflict from the perspective of people in the out-group, which was
previously de-legitimized9. Empathy is believed to reduce negative attitudes
toward the other group because it allows members of the opposing groups to see
that the perceived differences between the groups are not supported by evidence
and that the threat that they thought was emanating from the other group is also
exaggerated
10.
However, implementation of confidence-building programs in Cyprus, in the
context of conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians and elsewhere revealed
that addressing the socio-psychological aspects of protracted conflicts is a
challenging task. There is empirical evidence suggesting that attitudes and
perceptions of small groups as a result of inter-group encounters and dialogue
do change11. However, the real challenge is how to make such changes persistent
and how to spread newly acquired positive attitudes to embrace the whole
society.
Experience of confidence-building programs elsewhere indicates that attempts to
bridge mutually exclusive collective narratives, legitimization of the other
side's story, fostering critical assessment of one's group role in the conflict
spiral, and development of empathy and trust between the opposing groups will be
inevitably challenged by the dynamics of the on-going conflict and deep-rooted
societal beliefs internalized by the conflicting societies
12.
Allport was cautious himself about the results expected out of inter-group
encounters and identified the following pre-conditions under which contact could
produce positive results. The first condition is the frequency of interaction,
i.e. contact should be made regularly during specified period of time. The
second condition is environmental support, i.e. there should be societal demand
for such interaction and wider social support at all levels should be secured.
The third condition is equal status of participants during the interactions.
Equality is supposed to help actually change attitudes and perceptions of
participants towards each other, since, as will be discussed below, stereotypes
and prejudices are based on the devaluations and exclusion of others. And the
forth condition is cooperative environment during such encounters
13.
Some experts working in the field argue that it is not possible to achieve
positive results by simply bringing belligerent parties together14. This can be
partially explained by the difficulty to achieve all conditions specified by
Allport simultaneously amidst on-going conflict.
When the conflict is on-going, opposing parties enter the spiral of escalation
of conflict and every move of the other side is accepted with suspicion and
distrust. The conflict is increasingly viewed as a zero-sum confrontation, when
one side's winning by definition means that the other side loses. Goals and
interests of each side are viewed as diametrically opposed, and the groups
themselves become polarized15.
Under these circumstances, as was evidenced by the experience in the context of
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, unless inter-group encounters are consistent
and repeated on a regular basis, positive changes among participants after short
workshops evaporate in the course of a couple of months16. Even if such
encounters are sustained over time, people participating in these programs upon
return to their communities face the problem of "re-entry" i.e. dissonance
between their newly acquired perspective on the opposing groups and the
prevailing hostile attitude of their fellow citizens. Kadushin and Livert
explain this by the fact that personal relationships are part of broader
"informal networks" influenced by informal institutional arrangements such as
families, schools, work places and neighborhoods. People in such informal
institutional frameworks establish common norms and opinions, which eventually
transforms to the "social pressure" which group members find difficult to resist
to17.
In
order to secure support for such encounters by all levels of society there
should be a "societal agreement" on the objectives, goals and content of such
programs18. However, reaching a wider audience outside the narrow circle of
participants of inter-group contacts and trying to reverse the negative
attitudes and perceptions dominant in the society at large is also constantly
challenged by the current dynamics of conflict.
Until the consequences of the conflict are removed achieving equality of the
target groups seems to be problematic. If the sense of victimhood is not
eliminated on either side then there are little chances that encounters will be
fruitful. Speaking about the peace education programs David Perkins notes that
"peace education makes little sense when a strong aggressor is looming on your
borders."19
In
the context of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan it is obvious that
until the consequences of the conflict are removed and the IDPs return to their
homes they will perceive themselves vulnerable and any programs between
displaced Azerbaijani population and Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh region will
produce limited results.
The
forth condition specified by Allport - cooperative environment is also
constrained by the dynamics of the conflict. There is empirical evidence
suggesting that when the conflict is on-going participants of
confidence-building programs will capitalize on the relative gains and perceive
the whole process as a zero-sum game. As a result a sense of competition will
prevail during the meetings and may actually reverse the effects of the
programs20.
Analysis of the confidence-building programs implemented elsewhere from the
perspective of social and peace psychology disciplines21 allows concluding that
in real-life settings implementation of such programs is challenged by
contextual and situational factors that maintain negative attitudes and
perceptions among the conflicting groups and hinder the process of
reconciliation22.
Uncovering dynamics of conflicts: is it all about perceptions, attitudes and
prejudices?
Almost all existing definitions of conflict stress that the irreconcilable and
conflicting interests over scarce resources, territory or some other aspirations
are "perceived" by the members of the conflicting groups, implying that such
perceptions about divergent and incompatible interests may be detached from
reality23. There is a widely accepted belief that attitudes and perceptions
influence to a large extent the behaviors of the groups in conflict.
Negative attitudes and perceptions are partially maintained by prejudices and
stereotypes, which emerge in the natural process of social categorization of
individuals into groups24. In the inter-group behavior individuals are guided
not so much by their personal identities, but by their common identification as
a group, which is referred to as social identity25. Social identity of groups is
protected as well as enhanced artificially by elevating one's own group over the
other groups. Such devaluation of the "out-group" gradually becomes part of a
culture, constructing "Good Us" and "Evil Them"
26.
As
evidenced from the reviewed literature on the subject, although identity27
formation per se may follow inevitable natural purposes such as the need to
create separate ethnic identity and prejudices "have some automatic components
that operate outside our conscious awareness"28, in reality, on many occasions
the group's identity is ideologically sustained serving political objectives of
ruling elites. Similarly, negative attitudes and hostility towards other groups
are sometimes deliberately emphasized and can be easily manipulated
29.
One
of the consequences of using ethnic sentiments and animosities for political
purposes was and remains that soon political leadership becomes entrapped in its
own rhetoric that resonates with the dominant sentiments of society at large. As
a result, any government taking over the power is forced to continue pursuing
policies of their predecessors. As Coppieters argues, "it is not so easy to
accept the compromise solution when the basic interests or even survival of the
ethnic community or the state is declared to be at stake"30. Under these
circumstances, any unfavorable change of status quo in the conflict could
undermine positions of the political elites. This was clearly illustrated by the
ouster of the former Armenian president Levon Ter-Petrossian in February 1998,
when he showed readiness to accept the compromise solution to break the impasse
in the conflict resolution
31.
The
primary conclusion which can be made here is that the policies of the
authorities can be major obstacles to the desired changes in attitudes and
behaviors of collectives envisaged and expected by peace-building programs. If
so, then simply bringing small groups from conflicting sides together and
"working-through" negative memories and trauma without addressing factors
maintaining and reinforcing these negative attitudes and perceptions will
produce limited results.
Collectively held narratives - unquestioned truths or constructed past?
There are many ways (education, literature, media) though which negative
attitudes towards others are nourished and passed on to the next generations
thus maintaining the "spiral of violence". In the context of the protracted
conflicts attention should be given to formation of collective narratives, which
as evidenced by the research of the inter-group conflict become powerful
instrument of social exclusion and have implications for the implementation of
peace-building programs.
Collective narrative is a memory consisting of the shared beliefs, history,
aspirations, explanations and legitimization of in-groups behavior and attitude
toward out-groups transmitted from one generation to the other32. Emphasizing
the role history is playing in formation of collectively held narratives,
Salomon argues that "history not only provides the roots for a group's
collective narrative, but is reciprocally colored by the narrative: Historical
events are made to fit the narrative, are added or, more often, are excluded
from the narrative"33. It is worth mentioning here Salomon's observation that "a
group constructs a narrative that best suits its aspirations, interests and, if
there is inter-group conflict, builds its "true" account of the history of the
conflict by capitalizing on certain aspects of the conflict and "forgetting" or
excluding other events that do not fit well into the overall picture of "Good
Us" and "Evil Them"
34.
Such "selective information processing", as Pruitt and Kim call it, is used not
only when narratives are created but also in contemporary events when
information about the opposing party is carefully selected to support the
negative views. Constructed narratives de-legitimize goals, actions, history,
humanity and sufferings of the conflicting sides35. Thus, collectively held
narratives may be invisible at first sight, but influence to a large extent the
perceptions, attitudes and hence behavior of conflicting groups.
The
conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is a vivid example of how negative image
is artificially sustained by constructed narratives, which are turned into the
political instrument.
Of
particular importance is the impact of Armenian narrative related to the events
of 1915 to Armenians' perceptions about Azerbaijanis. Emphasis of
ethno-linguistic bonds of the Azerbaijanis with the Turks in the Armenian
historiography is a common place. The logic behind emphasizing ethno-linguistic
affinity of the Azerbaijanis towards the Turks became clear later when tensions
between Armenia and Azerbaijan escalated into overt violence. As argues Hunter
"Armenians often identify Azerbaijanis with Turks, thus creating an association
between Azerbaijanis and the 'Armenian Genocide'"36. Given the deep-rooted
negative feelings among Armenians toward Turks associated with the alleged
events of the 1915, and the role this perceived group trauma plays in Armenian
identity, it is possible to argue that this linkage was used to mobilize
Armenians around "Armenian cause" by expanding the sense of animosity, Armenians
feel towards Turks, to include Azerbaijanis37. Historical linkages of
contemporary events are also made with events that happened thousands years ago
in different circumstances and more importantly, which do not have direct link
to the present-day conflict
38.
Clearly, Armenian national leaders used history to construct narratives to fit
in the "right cause" by identifying the adversary, strengthening and
consolidating Armenians' group identity around "Karabakh issue" and nourishing a
sense of frustration - all important factors, which according to social conflict
theory contribute to mobilization of "conflict group" willing to challenge the
status-quo39. The fact that historical events were used by Armenian nationalists
to justify current politics is also recognized by the Armenian authors40. One of
the consequences of the group mobilization in Armenia was strong group
identification of both in-group and out-group, i.e. "Good Us" vs. "Evil Them",
which coupled with national aspirations, generated potential for breaking out of
conflict.
Thus, zero-sum attitudes and conflicting, mutually exclusive narratives created
what Kelman calls "negative interdependence" of identities, i.e. conviction that
the other side wants to destruct one's identity or assert its identity at the
expense of the other's41. Under these conditions, such an important ingredient
of any confidence-building programs as acceptance of other side's collective
narrative will face serious challenges.
As
a result of social constructs, deep-rooted societal beliefs internalized by the
conflicting societies gradually become highly resistant to change and, unless
taken into account, may constitute a major challenge in the process of achieving
coexistence and reconciliation.
Confidence-building through facilitated dialogue: conflict resolution or
post-conflict reconciliation tool?
As
evidenced by the experience of confidence-building programs in the conflict in
Cyprus, Israeli-Palestinian context and elsewhere such programs are vulnerable
to current political atmosphere42. Most scholars working in the field note that
such initiatives can produce only limited results, when the conflict and
hostilities are on-going43. The developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
prove that major political and military events may contribute to the maintenance
of the existing strained relations between the groups and halt the modest
attempts to initiate dialogue and foster mutual understanding between the
opposing groups
44.
Hence, confidence-building through inter-group contacts will produce better
results when implemented in the de-escalation phase of the conflict. This is why
experts working in the filed conclude that initiatives aimed at establishing
inter-group dialogue should be complementary to the efforts made at the
governmental level to transform the nature of conflict and overall attitudes
towards the other side.
Thus said, confidence-building programs in the context of the conflict between
Armenia and Azerbaijan will most probably produce limited results amidst
on-going conflict. Current political events will constantly reinforce zero-sum
thinking and will foster negative perceptions and attitudes between the
societies.
In
the regions of protracted conflict, it is crucial that peace-building programs
are carried out simultaneously at all levels of conflicting societies. However,
promoting the ideas of empathy, trust and peaceful coexistence at the
governmental level that would embrace the whole society is the most challenging
endeavor.
Conclusion
There is substantial evidence suggesting that as a result of facilitated
inter-group contact attitudes and perceptions between opposing groups do change
in a positive manner. This may create grounds for elimination of mutual
prejudices and stereotypes and eventually diminish hostilities and subsequently
improve inter-group relations.
However, the real challenge is how to make such changes persistent and how to
spread newly acquired positive attitudes throughout societies. Experience of
confidence-building programs elsewhere indicates that in real-life settings
attempts to bridge mutually exclusive collective narratives, legitimization of
the other side's story, fostering critical assessment of one's group role in the
conflict spiral, and development of empathy and trust between the opposing
groups is challenged by the dynamics of the on-going conflict and deep-rooted
societal beliefs internalized by the conflicting societies.
Thus said, by simply bringing small groups from conflicting sides together and
"working-through" negative memories and trauma without addressing factors
maintaining and reinforcing these negative attitudes and perceptions will
produce limited results.
It
is possible to conclude that initiatives aimed at building confidence should be
complementary to the efforts made at the governmental level to transform the
nature of conflict and overall attitudes towards the other side. Hence,
confidence-building through inter-group contacts will produce better results
when implemented in the de-escalation phase of the conflict.
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